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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law - Fraudulent Claim of Citizenship as a Criminal Offense
-An alien seeking employment with a company engaged in war work,
in answer to a question as to where he was born, replied, "Chicago,
Illinois." He was indicted for "falsely and wilfully misrepresenting
himself to be a United States citizen"1 with the fraudulent purpose of
securing, as such citizen, employment in a war plant. Held: The de-
fendant's answer was not a sufficient misrepresentation to sustain the
conviction. United States v. Weber, 185 F. (2d) 479, (11th cir., 1950).
The statute in the case noted,2 making a false and wilful misrepre-
sentation of citizenship a felony, has existed in the law since 1870.- It
was originally passed as part of a comprehensive plan regulating the
conduct of aliens, and made it a misdemeanor for any person not duly
admitted to citizenship, for any fradulent purpose whatever, to repre-
sent himself as a citizen of the United States. There apparently were
no reported cases involving this original act. In 1940, Congress in-
creased the penalties and changed the wording slightly, "to extend the
coverage in view of the impending var."4 As amended, the first convic-
tions under the statute were reported.5 Subsequently, in 1948, Congress
evidently believing the crisis over, lowered the penalties and substi-
tuted the word "wilfully" in place of "knowingly." However, this
change has not seemed to have slowed down the pace of convictions,
and may even prove the opposite effect by making juries more willing
to convict in view of the relatively less severe penalties.
As written and if broadly construed, the law makes a simple false
claim to citizenship a crime, and it has been held to be within the power
of Congress to do so.6 However, in view of the severe penalties, the
courts have not assumed that Congress intended such penalties were
intended for words spoken in jest or boast, as the use of the word
"falsely" particularly in a criminal statute suggests something more
than a mere untruth. For that reason, the courts have, by interpreta-
tion, made the requirement for a fraudulent purpose an essential in-
gredient of the crime.7 Judicial construction has also limited the appli-
cation of the statute to those situations where some right to inquire
exists or the person inquiring has a good and sufficient reason for learn-
ing the citizenship of the person asked s
There are two problems that have arisen in view of this judicial
construction:
162 Stat 742 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §911 (1946), "Whoever falsely and wilfully
misrepresents himself to be a citizen of the United States shall be fined not
more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both."
2 Supra, note 1.
316 Stat. 255 (1870).
4 U.S. v. Achtner, 144 F. (2d) 49, 52 (2d cir., 1944).
5 U.S. v. Frederick, 50 F.Supp. 769 (1943).
6 Supra, note 5.
7U.S. v. Weber, 71 F.Supp. 88 (1944).8Smiley v. U.S., 181 F. (2d) 515 (9th cir., 1950).
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1) What acts must be shown to prove such a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation as a United States citizen?
2) When do the courts consider as having a 'right to inquire' of
another as to his citizenship?
In answer to the first problem as to what acts are necessry to con-
stitute such a misrepresentation, a mere assertion of birth in the United
States is not enough (as indicated in'the case noted) because a person
may be born here and still not be a United States citizen. Likewise an
assertion of American birth coupled with a claim of being just a "citi-
zen," without specifying what kind, was held not sufficient to sustain a
convictionf But an affirmative answer to the direct question, "Are you a
United States citizen ?" was held sufficient to convict in the leading case
of Smiley v. United States.10 In another case, analogous to the noted
case in that it also involved an alien attempting to secure employment
in a war plant which he knew employed only United States citizens,
the court held the evidence, (defendant wrote 'yes' in answer to ques-
tion on employment blank as to whether he was a United States citi-
zen) sufficient to sustain a conviction."' As a general proposition, it can
almost be said that while a claim of citizenship made in boast or jest is
not a sufficient misrepresentation to sustain a conviction, any claim
made seriously with an intent to deceive is.
In answer to the second question as to whom do the courts consider
as having a right to inquire, that a police officer does is obvious.n But
in answer to attacks that the misrepresentation must be made only to a
government officer, the courts have held that there is no ground for
such a weakening of the statute."3 Others who have been held to have
a right to inquire have been, election officials,' 4 union officials,15 and a
private employer.16 Language of the courts indicates that anyone with a
legitimate purpose and not a mere busbybody, may be said to have a
right to inquire. 17
In light of the foregoing, in the case noted had there been a direct
question asking defendant if he were a United States citizen, and had
defendant answered "yes" knowing that he was not, but intending to
deceive his employer in order to secure employment in a war plant,
proof of these facts would have sustained a conviction, and made de-
fendant liable for the rather severe penalties that have been meted out
under the statute. This rather simple proof required for a conviction
seems to render the statute a ready vehicle for despotic treatment of
9 Sipra, note 8.
'o0 Supra, note 8.
" U.S. v. Tandaric, 152 F.(2d) 3 (7th cir., 1945).
12 Supra, note 8.
13 Supra, note 4.
14Supra, note 5.
15U.S. v. Romberg, 150 F.(2d) 116 (2d cir., 1945).
16 Supra, note 11.
"7Supra, note 8.
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aliens. Judicious application on the part of the law enforcement officials,
however, has kept arrests within bounds and the statute today remains
as a strong deterrent to aliens seeking to masquerade as United States
citizens.
IRVING W. ZIRBEL
Torts - Undertaking Establishments as a Nuisance - Defendant, an
undertaker, purchased three lots in the city of Fort Dodge, Iowa, and
began excavation for a funeral home. Plaintiffs owned a large resi-
dence across the street from the defendant's property. The area con-
tained some of the older and better residences of the city, but the busi-
ness district had moved to within one block of the properties. Plaintiff
sought an injunction restraining defendant from erecting the estab-
lishment on the grounds that it would have such a depressing effect
upon the members of his family as to impair their comfort and enjoy-
ment of their home and depreciate the value of their property.
Held: Injunction denied. Since the block in which the plaintiffs lived
was not zoned and in a state of transition from residential use to com-
mercial use, and was not restricted by ordinance to residential uses. The
plaintiffs would not see caskets loaded or undoaded, or hear funeral
services, and it did not clearly appear that a nuisance would necessarily
result. Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 43 N.W. (2d) 726 (Iowa, 1950).
In considering the problem involved in the main case the courts dis-
tinguished between a funeral home being established in a residential
district from one being established in a business district. In either case
the undertaking business has generally been held not to be a nuisance
per se.1 However, when established in a residential area the courts re-
quire a higher degree of proper conduct of the business and do consid-
er the depressing effect on the neighbors.
In an earlier Iowa case the undertaking establishment was enjoined
from continuing operation, but there the establishment was to be lo-
cated in a purely residential district, and the driveway where the bodies
were to be loaded and unloaded was only nineteen feet from that plain-
tiff's hoise, and the building was not to be soundproofed. In the princi-
pal case loading of bodies was to be done within the enclosure of the
building on the far side of the establishment from the plaintiff's house,
and the building was to be soundproofed. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court3 has held that an undertaking establishment would be enjoined as
a nuisance when located in a purely residential district when it operated
266 CJ.S. 820 (1950).
2 Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N.W. 98 (1937).
3 Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W. 531 (1922).
